हमास, हिजबुल्ला के बाद अब हूती ने किया जंग का ऐलान
तेल अवीवः इजरायल-हमास युद्ध के बीच लगातार 25 दिनों से युद्ध जारी है. इस युद्ध में हमास के अलावा लेबनान का आतंकी संगठन हिजबुल्लाह भी इजरायली सेना के खिलाफ हमला बोल रखा है. वहीं अब इस जंग में तीसरे मोर्चे की एंट्री होने वाली है. जो कि यमन का संगठन हूती है. हूती विद्रोहियों ने आधिकारिक तौर पर इजरायल के खिलाफ और फिलिस्तीन के पक्ष में जंग का ऐलान कर दिया है. हूती विद्रोहियों की सरकार के प्रधानमंत्री अजीज बिन हबूतर ने कहा कि हम अपने लोगों को गाजा में मरने के लिए नहीं छोड़ सकते.
हूति विद्रोहियों ने धमकी दी है कि अगर गाजा में सीजफायर नहीं हुआ तो वो इजरायल पर और बैलिस्टिक मिसाइल दागेगा. हूती ने साल 2014 में यमन की राजधानी सहित देश के कई बड़े हिस्से पर कब्जा किया हुआ है. टाइम्स ऑफ इजराइल ने हूती समूह के प्रवक्ता याह्या सरिया के हवाले से कहा कि हवाई हमले गाजा के लोगों के लिए धार्मिक, नैतिक, मानवीय और राष्ट्रीय जिम्मेदारी की भावना के कारण किए गए थे, जो इजरायली बमबारी के चलते बढ़ते मानवीय संकट का सामना कर रहे हैं.” यरुशलम में सोमवार को प्रधान मंत्री बेंजामिन नेतन्याहू ने ईरान पर यमन से इज़राइल पर सटीक-निर्देशित मिसाइलें लॉन्च करने की तैयारी करने का आरोप लगाया था.
कौन हैं हूती विद्रोही
हूतियों का उदय 1980 के दशक में यमन में हुआ था. यह मुस्लिमों का बड़ा आदिवासी संगठन है. हूती अब्दुलाह सालेह की आर्थिक नीतियों से नाराज थे, जिसके चलते यमन के उत्तरी क्षेत्र में असमानता बढ़ गई और साल 2000 में हूतियों ने नागरिक सेना तैयार की. हूतियों से साल 2004 से 2010 के बीच अब्दुल्लाह सालेह की सेना से कुल 6 युद्ध किए. साल 2011 में अरब के हस्तक्षेप के चलते यह युद्ध रुक गया और करीब दो साल तक बातचीत चलती रही. लेकिन कोई हल नहीं निकला.
Hend F Q
70 seriously injured people from Gaza are in ambulances leaving through Egypt for necessary medical treatment. Unfortunately, Israel doesn’t allow anyone that leaves to come back. The needed bed space is for the expected dying and injured which Israel plans to terrorize the locals to force them into leaving.
Bangladesh News 24
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗛𝗼𝘂𝘁𝗵𝗶 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗳𝗹𝗶𝗰𝘁: 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗴𝗴𝗹𝗲𝘀, 𝗘𝗻𝗲𝗺𝗶𝗲𝘀, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗙𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗕𝗮𝗰𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴
Introduction: The Houthi movement, officially known as Ansar Allah, is an armed political and religious group that has played a pivotal role in Yemen’s complex and ongoing conflict. This article will delve into the struggles faced by the Houthi movement, their adversaries, and the sources of their financial support.
1. Historical Background: The Houthi movement originated in the early 2000s as a Zaidi Shia revivalist movement in northern Yemen. They have faced ongoing discrimination and marginalization by the Yemeni government, which led to grievances that fueled their insurgency.
2. Internal Challenges: The Houthi movement faces the complexities of governing territory, maintaining internal cohesion, and providing services to the areas under their control. This includes navigating tribal dynamics, sectarian tensions, and governing a fragmented Yemen.
1. Yemeni Government and Coalition Forces: The Houthi movement’s main adversaries are the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The coalition has been conducting military operations against the Houthis since 2015.
2. Al-Qaeda and ISIS: The Houthi movement is also opposed by jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS, who have exploited the instability in Yemen.
Financial Backing: The financial support for the Houthi movement is a complex and contentious issue.
The following are key aspects:
1. Iranian Support: The Houthi movement has received political and military support from Iran, which has been accused of providing weapons, training, and financial aid. However, the extent of Iran’s involvement remains disputed.
2. Local Revenue: The Houthis control areas with significant revenue-generating assets, such as ports and taxes, which contribute to their financial sustainability.
3. Remittances and Charities: The Houthi movement has also benefited from remittances sent by Yemeni expatriates and funds from charities.
4. Looting and Extortion: There have been allegations of the Houthis engaging in looting and extortion to fund their activities.
Conclusion: The Houthi movement’s struggles, enemies, and financial support are critical elements in understanding the ongoing Yemeni conflict. Their ability to navigate these challenges will significantly impact the future of Yemen and the broader Middle East.
The Houthi movement[a] (/ˈhuːθi/; Arabic: ٱلْحُوثِيُّون, romanized: al-Ḥūthīyūn [al.ħuː.θiː.juːn]), officially called Ansar Allah (Arabic: أَنْصَار ٱللَّٰه, romanized: ʾAnṣār Allāh, lit. ’Supporters of God’) and colloquially simply Houthis, is an Islamist political and armed organization that emerged from the Yemeni governorate of Saada in the 1990s. The Houthi movement is a predominately Zaidi force, whose leadership is drawn largely from the Houthi tribe.
Under the leadership of Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, the group emerged as an opposition to former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. They accused him of corruption and criticized him for being backed by Saudi Arabia and the United States. Hussein accused Saleh of seeking to please the U.S. at the expense of the Yemeni people and Yemen’s sovereignty. In 2003, the Houthis’ slogan, “God is great, death to the US, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam”, became the group’s trademark. Resisting Saleh’s order for his arrest, Hussein was killed in Sa’dah in 2004 along with a number of his guards by the Yemeni army, sparking the Houthi insurgency in Yemen. Since then, except for a short intervening period, the movement has been led by his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.
Yemen’s former president Ali Abdullah Saleh was allied with Houthis from 2014 until his death in 2017. The Houthis assassinated him on charges of treason.
The Houthi movement attracts followers in Yemen by portraying themselves as fighting for economic development, the end of political marginalization of Zaidi Shia Muslims, and promoting regional political-religious issues in its media, fostering the rhetoric of an overarching U.S.–Israeli conspiracy theory and Arab “collusion”. The Houthis have a complex relationship with Yemen’s Sunni Muslims; the movement has discriminated against Sunnis, but also recruited and allied with them.The Houthis took part in the 2011 Yemeni Revolution by participating in street protests and by coordinating with other opposition groups. They joined the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative to broker peace following the unrest. However, the Houthis would later reject the November 2011 GCC deal’s provisions stipulating formation of six federal regions in Yemen, claiming that the deal did not fundamentally reform governance and that the proposed federalization “divided Yemen into poor and wealthy regions”. Houthis also feared the deal was a blatant attempt to weaken them by dividing areas under their control between separate regions. In late 2014, Houthis repaired their relationship with the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and with his help, they took control of the capital and much of the north, and announced the fall of the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.
(October 2022) political and military control
Since 2015, the Houthis have been fighting the Saudi Arabian–led intervention in Yemen that seeks to establish full territorial control by the internationally recognized government within Yemen. Additionally, the Islamic State militant group has attacked all of the major parties to the conflict, including the Houthis, forces loyal to former president Saleh, the Yemeni government, and the Saudi Arabian–led coalition forces.The Houthis aim to govern all of Yemen, and external anti-imperialist movements against the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. They have launched repeated missile and drone attacks against Saudi cities. The conflict is widely seen as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.In 2023, the movement also launched missiles at Israeli cities
According to Ahmed Addaghashi, a professor at Sanaa University, the Houthis began as a moderate theological movement that preached tolerance and held a broad-minded view of all the Yemeni peoples. Their first organization, “the Believing Youth” (BY), was founded in 1992 in Saada Governorate: 1008 by either Mohammed al-Houthi,: 98 or his brother Hussein al-Houthi.
The Believing Youth established school clubs and summer camps[: 98 in order to “promote a Zaidi revival” in Saada. By 1994–1995, 15–20,000 students had attended BY summer camps. The religious material included lectures by Mohammed Hussein Fadhlallah (a Lebanese shia scholar) and Hassan Nasrallah (Secretary General of Lebanon’s Hezbollah Party)]
The formation of the Houthi organisations has been described by Adam Baron of the European Council on Foreign Relations as a reaction to foreign intervention. Their views include shoring up Zaydi support against the perceived threat of Saudi-influenced ideologies in Yemen and a general condemnation of the former Yemeni government’s alliance with the United States, which, along with complaints regarding the government’s corruption and the marginalisation of much of the Houthis’ home areas in Saada, constituted the group’s key grievances.
Although Hussein al-Houthi, who was killed in 2004, had no official relation with Believing Youth, according to Zaid, he contributed to the radicalisation of some Zaydis after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. BY-affiliated youth adopted anti-American and anti-Jewish slogans, which they chanted in the Saleh Mosque in Sanaa after Friday prayers. According to Zaid, the followers of Houthi’s insistence on chanting the slogans attracted the authorities’ attention, further increasing government worries over the extent of the Houthi movement’s influence. “The security authorities thought that if today the Houthis chanted ‘Death to America’, tomorrow they could be chanting ‘Death to the president [of Yemen]”. 800 BY supporters were arrested in Sanaa in 2004. President Ali Abdullah Saleh then invited Hussein al-Houthi to a meeting in Sanaa, but Hussein declined. On 18 June 2004 Saleh sent government forces to arrest Hussein.
Yemen’s ethnoreligious groups in 2002.
Hussein responded by launching an insurgency against the central government, but was killed on 10 September 2004. The insurgency continued intermittently until a ceasefire agreement was reached in 2010. During this prolonged conflict, the Yemeni army and air force was used to suppress the Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen. The Saudis joined these anti-Houthi campaigns, but the Houthis won against both Saleh and the Saudi army. According to the Brookings Institution, this particularly humiliated the Saudis, who spent tens of billions of dollars on their military.
Later, the Houthis participated in the 2011 Yemeni Revolution, as well as the ensuing National Dialogue Conference (NDC). However, they rejected the provisions of the November 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council deal on the ground that “it divide Yemen into poor and wealthy regions” and also in response to assassination of their representative at NDC.
As the revolution went on, Houthis gained control of greater territory. By 9 November 2011, Houthis were said to be in control of two Yemeni governorates (Saada and Al Jawf) and close to taking over a third governorate (Hajjah),which would enable them to launch a direct assault on the Yemeni capital of Sanaa. In May 2012, it was reported that the Houthis controlled a majority of Saada, Al Jawf, and Hajjah governorates; they had also gained access to the Red Sea and started erecting barricades north of Sanaa in preparation for more conflict
By 21 September 2014, Houthis were said to control parts of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, including government buildings and a radio station. While Houthi control expanded to the rest of Sanaa, as well as other towns such as Rada’, this control was strongly challenged by Al-Qaeda. The Gulf States believed that the Houthis had accepted aid from Iran while Saudi Arabia was aiding their Yemeni rivals.[
On 20 January 2015, Houthi rebels seized the presidential palace in the capital. President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was in the presidential palace during the takeover, but was not harmed.The movement officially took control of the Yemeni government on 6 February, dissolving parliament and declaring its Revolutionary Committee to be the acting authority in Yemen. On 20 March 2015, The al-Badr and al-Hashoosh mosques came under suicide attack during midday prayers, and the Islamic State quickly claimed responsibility. The blasts killed 142 Houthi worshippers and wounded more than 351, making it the deadliest terrorist attack in Yemen’s history.
On 27 March 2015, in response to perceived Houthi threats to Sunni factions in the region, Saudi Arabia along with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan led a gulf coalition airstrike in Yemen.The military coalition included the United States which helped in planning of airstrikes, as well as logistical and intelligence support.
According to a 2015 September report by Esquire magazine, the Houthis, once the outliers, are now one of the most stable and organised social and political movements in Yemen. The power vacuum created by Yemen’s uncertain transitional period has drawn more supporters to the Houthis. Many of the formerly powerful parties, now disorganised with an unclear vision, have fallen out of favour with the public, making the Houthis—under their newly branded Ansar Allah name—all the more attractive.
Houthi spokesperson Mohamed Abdel Salam stated that his group had spotted messages between the UAE and Saleh three months before his death. He told Al-Jazeera that there was communication between Saleh, UAE and a number of other countries such as Russia and Jordan through encrypted messages The alliance between Saleh and the Houthi broke down in late 2017,with armed clashes occurring in Sanaa from 28 November.Saleh declared the split in a televised statement on 2 December, calling on his supporters to take back the country and expressed openness to a dialogue with the Saudi-led coalition. On 4 December 2017, Saleh’s house in Sanaa was assaulted by fighters of the Houthi movement, according to residents. Saleh was killed by the Houthis on the same day.
In January 2021, the United States designated the Houthis a terrorist organization, creating fears of an aid shortage in Yemen, but this stance was reversed a month later after Joe Biden became president.
On 17 January 2022, Houthi missile and drone attacks on UAE industrial targets set fuel trucks on fire and killed three foreign workers. This was the first specific attack to which the Houthi admitted, and the first to result in deaths.A response led by Saudi Arabia included a 21 January air strike on a detention centre in Yemen, resulting in at least 70 deaths
There is a difference between the al-Houthi family: 102 and the Houthi movement. The movement was called by their opponents and foreign media “Houthis”. The name came from the surname of the early leader of the movement, Hussein al-Houthi, who died in 2004.
The Houthis avoid assuming a singular tribal identity. Instead, the group strategically draws support from tribes of the northern Bakil federation, rival to the Hashid federation which had been a traditional ally of the central government. The Houthis’ lack of centralised command structure allows them to generate immense support, as Yemenis from diverse backgrounds have joined their cause.
Membership of the group had between 1,000 and 3,000 fighters as of 2005[and between 2,000 and 10,000 fighters as of 2009. In 2010, the Yemen Post claimed that they had over 100,000 fighters. According to Houthi expert Ahmed Al-Bahri, by 2010, the Houthis had a total of 100,000–120,000 followers, including both armed fighters and unarmed loyalists.
As of 2015, the group is reported to have attracted new supporters from outside their traditional demographics
In general, the Houthi movement has centered its belief system on the Zaydi branch of Islam, a sect of Islam almost exclusively present in Yemen. Zaydis make up about 25 percent of the population, Sunnis make up 75 percent. Zaydi-led governments ruled Yemen for 1,000 years up until 1962. Since its foundation, the Houthi movement has often acted as advocates for Zaydi revivalism in Yemen
Forms of government
In general, the Houthis’ political ideology has gradually shifted from “heavily-religious mobilisation and activism under Husayn to the more assertive and statesmanlike rhetoric under Abdulmalik”, its current leader.Due to strong support received by Houthis from the predominantly Zaydi northern tribes, the Houthi movement has often been described as tribalist or monarchist faction in opposition to republicanism.Regardless, they have managed to rally many people outside of their traditional bases to their cause, and became a major nationalist force.
When armed conflict for the first time erupted back in 2004 between the Yemeni government and Houthis, the President Ali Abdullah Saleh accused the Houthis and other Islamic opposition parties of trying to overthrow the government and the republican system. However, Houthi leaders, for their part, rejected the accusation by saying that they had never rejected the president or the republican system, but were only defending themselves against government attacks on their community. After their takeover of northern Yemen in 2014, the Houthis remained committed to republicanism and continued to celebrate republican holidays.The Houthis have an ambivalent stance on the possible transformation of Yemen into a federation or the separation into two fully independent countries to solve the country’s crisis. Though not opposed to these plans per se, they have declined any plans which would in their eyes marginalize the northern tribes politically.
Meanwhile, their opponents have asserted that the Houthis desire to institute Zaydi religious law,destabilising the government and stirring anti-American sentiment.In contrast, Hassan al-Homran, a former Houthi spokesperson, has said that “Ansar Allah supports the establishment of a civil state in Yemen. We want to build a striving modern democracy. Our goals are to fulfil our people’s democratic aspirations in keeping with the Arab Spring movement.” In an interview with Yemen Times, Hussein al-Bukhari, a Houthi insider, said that Houthis’ preferable political system is a republic with elections where women can also hold political positions, and that they do not seek to form a cleric-led government after the model of Islamic Republic of Iran, for “we cannot apply this system in Yemen because the followers of the Shafi (Sunni) doctrine are bigger in number than the Zaydis”. In 2018, the Houthi leadership proposed the establishment of a non-partisan transitional government composed of technocrats.
Ali Akbar Velayati, International Affairs Advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stated in October 2014 that “We are hopeful that Ansar-Allah has the same role in Yemen as Hezbollah has in eradicating the terrorists in Lebanon”.Mohammed Ali al-Houthi criticized the Trump-brokered Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates as “betrayal” against the Palestinians and the cause of pan-Arabism.
Although they have framed their struggle in religious terms and put great importance in their Zaydi roots, the Houthis are not an exclusively Zaydi group. In fact, they have outright rejected their portrayal by others as a faction which is purportedly only interested in Zaydi-related issues. They have not publicly advocated for the restoration of the old Zaydi imamate, although analysts have argued that they might plan to restore it in the future.Most Yemenis have a low opinion of the old imamate, and Hussein al-Houthi also did not advocate the imamate’s restoration. Instead, he proposed a “Guiding Eminence” (alam al-huda), an individual descended from the Prophet who would act as a “universal leader for the world”, though never defined this position’s prerogatives or how they should be appointed.
The movement has also recruited and allied with Sunni Muslims; according to researcher Ahmed Nagi, several themes of the Houthi ideology “such as Muslim unity, prophetic lineages, and opposition to corruption […] allowed the Houthis to mobilize not only northern Zaydis, but also inhabitants of predominantly Shafi’i areas.” However, the group is known to have discriminated against Sunni Muslims as well, closing Sunni mosques and primarily placing Zaydis in leadership positions in Houthi-controlled areas. The Houthis lost significant support among Sunni tribes after killing ex-President Saleh.
Many Zaydis also oppose the Houthis, regarding them as Iranian proxies and the Houthis’ form of Zaydi revivalism an attempt to “establish Shiite rule in the north of Yemen”. In addition, Haykel argued that the Houthis follow a “a highly politicised, revolutionary, and intentionally simplistic, even primitivist interpretation of [Zaydism]’s teachings”. Their view of Islam is largely based on the teachings of Hussein al-Houthi, collected after his death in a book titled Malazim (Fascicles), a work treated by Houthis as more important than older Zaydi theological traditions, resulting in repeated disputes with established Zaydi religious leaders. The Malazim reflect a number of different religious and ideological influences, including by Khomeinism and revolutionary Sunni Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Hussein al-Houthi believed that the “last exemplary” Zaydi scholar and leader was Al-Hadi ila’l-Haqq Yahya; later Zaydi imams were regarded as having deviated from the original form of Islam. The Houthis’ belief in the “Quranic Way” also includes the rejection of tafsir (Quranic interpretations) as being derivative and divisive, meaning that they have a low opinion of most existing Islamic theological and juridical schools,including Zaydi traditionalists based in Sanaa with whom they often clash.
The Houthis claim that their actions are to fight against the alleged expansion of Salafism in Yemen, and for the defence of their community from discrimination.In the years before the rise of the Houthi movement, state-supported Salafis had harassed Zaydis and destroyed Zaydi sites in Yemen.After their rise to power in 2014, the Houthis consequently “crushed” the Salafi community in Saada Governorate and mostly eliminated the al-Qaeda presence in the areas under their control;the Houthis view al-Qaeda as “Salafi jihadists” and thus “mortal enemies”.On the other side, between 2014 and 2019, the Houthi leadership have signed multiple co-existence agreements with the Salafi community; pursuing Shia-Salafi reconciliation.The Yemeni government has often accused the Houthis of collaborating with al-Qaeda to undermine its control of southern Yemen